Why Wingbacks have once again emerged in Euro 2020
Noah Eliot
One of the dominant tactical storylines of Euro 2020 (in 2021) has been the success “three at the back” systems have had in this tournament. Part of international football, Men’s or Women’s, is making the most of the talent that your country has, which is far more limited than in the club game. Additional restrictions are also placed on national team managers as national teams have limited time to work together and the players are often fatigued after long club seasons, while facing compressed tournament schedules on top of that. I believe that these forces combined contribute to why set-ups with 3 central defenders and wingbacks have been strong in Euro 2020.
Wingbacks are a useful tactical shortcut in attack
To start with, a common 3–4–3 shape can provide short cuts to tactical fluidity and flexibility. If a team were to push one of the wing backs forward, while the nearest centreback covered wide defensively and the other wing back played more like a fullback, you could easily create a 4–3–3 or 4–2–3–1 shape in attack. These rotations are similar to Arsenal from the restart in 2020 until the new year under Mikel Arteta and Thomas Tuchel’s 3–4–3 at Chelsea, where the team had to adapt to his style midseason. Both coaches used the 3–4–3 shape as a solid base for their teams to learn to attack in ways that are common to positional play in a 4–3–3, while ensuring defensive solidity. The key is that the 3–4–3 also allows teams easily access an aggressive attacking shape in a 3–2–5.
The most straightforward way seeing both wing backs pushing up as the wingers’ tuck inside, covering all five channels across the width of the pitch, while also having the two central midfielders in front of the three central defenders. Thus, remaining solid to support of attacks and suppress opposition counterattacks. Many club teams play with a “back four” and can still shift into a 3–2–5 shape in attack, however, this often comes with more complex rotations, more specific tactical roles and more practice on pressing systems. The use of a back four that adheres to the rule of positional play in attack to properly defend can require practice time and specific players national teams do not have the luxury to have or acquire. Finally, a 3–4–3 shape has simplicity that allows for shifts into a different attacking look in the 3–2–1–2 or even a defensive 5–3–2 by moving a central attacker/midfielder/striker up and down the central channel. The ability to fluidly move between shapes and rotations allows a basic 3–4–3 template to act as a cheat code for tactical patterns in national team set-ups that can understandably lack cohesion, while also allowing limited squads to cope with their shortcomings.
Three average defenders versus two average defenders covering the same amount of space. Which do you prefer?
The popularity of high defensive lines and “building out from the back” with shorter passing moves in club football has come in response to pressing systems that defend intensely from the front. These developments have blended into national team football as well. This has resulted in defenders taking on a greater load on the ball and having to cover larger areas off ball when teams run at them on the counter-attack. It has become something of a joke to say that much of modern football tactics has been looking at 2 mediocre central defenders trying to simply adding a third to solve the problem. In club sides this may be too simple of a solution, better pressing systems or more precise roles such as inverted fullbacks who support the midfield can provide greater support for defenders without having to sacrifice a midfielder for a central defender, but national teams likely do not have the time or ability to develop the specific systems or acquire the specific players needed in order to make them work.
One of the defining developments in the 2020/21 Premier League season was Manchester City’s shift to a 3–3–4 in possession, a slight variation on the 3–2–5 shape in attack Pep Guardiola had brought to England to great success. This seemingly small change was designed in order to supress counter attacks by allowing for greater midfield screening for central defenders. It traded high pressing for cutting off passing lanes in transition and generally resulted in tandem with lower intensity pressing and a lower defensive line leading to defenders having less space to cover. The addition of another central defender may be attractive to international managers because of its simplicity and the fact that three players covering the space normally devoted to just two players will have less space to cover and misthore support in defending and attempting to pass the ball around. If central defenders are going to be asked to do more and you do not have the ability to drill a system in just a few weeks that is based upon rotations and collective understandings to support them in all of the modern responsibilities of central defenders, reducing the level of their responsibilities without removing their participation in modern tactical staples is another advantage.
Wingbacks can cause overloads within the opposition 18-yard box
The final advantage that has come to light during Euro 2020 (in 2021) is a numerical one in attack. A 3–4–3 that turns into a 3–2–5 in attack can create simple overloads against a back four. We saw this with Germany, as their wingbacks were able to combine with midfielders and inverted wingers to create overloads out wide against Portugal for crossing opportunities. They were then also able to create overloads within the penalty box as it was often three Portuguese defenders covering four German attackers. As the Portuguese defenders often pressured the German wingback with their fullback, which ended up with the opposite German wingback uncovered, with the three remaining Portuguese defenders covering three German attackers and the other wingback, who was thus able receive a cross for a headed chance. This overload could be dealt with by bringing an additional midfielder or attacker back to cover the cross or the extra man in the box. But at the very least this creates an additional rotation for the defending team. An extra defensive step in an environment where cohesion may be lacking, like international football, could lead to miscommunications that could still benefit the team in the “three at the back” system.
This could also help explain why England decided to match the Germans in the round of 16 with their own back three in order to deal with the overloads that present themselves when a 3–4–3 takes on a back four. Matching systems may have been seen as a worrisome concession from Gareth Southgate, but it did nullify the numerical advantages out wide the Germans had previously exploited. In general England were arguably the more talented team on paper and that was likely to show through, so long as Germany could not create the crucial numerical advantages that England’s matching system reduced. It remains to be seen how useful the tactical developments of Euro 2020 will be in future club seasons and international tournaments, but it does present the possibility that a more attacking back three could be useful for underdogs or teams seeking a different attacking look within a game.
